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Abstract: This articles explores the ratio and characteristics of the right of anonymity on the 
Internet. A right of anonymity is considered as a shield against oppression, harassment,  
retaliation, censorship or discrimination and therefore it is considered as a vital component 
of freedom of speech or freedom of expression. Reference is made to several existing types of 
rights of anonymity in relation to freedom of expression, such as the right to protect 
(confidential) journalistic sources, free elections with secret ballot, the right of authors to 
create works under a pseudonym or anonymous, undercover or alias journalism... A right of 
anonymity however will inevitably have a relative character, due to society’s interest in 
determining one’s accountability, responsibility or liability in case of illegal or harmful 
content. In criminal law, for reasons of civil liability, for the protection of intellectual 
property law or in the area of commercial communications and advertising, the need for 
identification has reduced the scope of protection of one’s right to anonymity. It is explained 
how this approach is reflected in Principle 7 of the Declaration of the Council of Europe on 
Freedom of Communication on the Internet (28 May 2003). Striking a fair balance between 
the right of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity and tracing those responsible for 
criminal acts is the difficult but also inevitable challenge in this regard, a balance which 
cannot be found without respecting rigorously the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
the involved persons. These rights and freedoms also need to be protected with extra 
procedural guarantees, e.g. regarding the disclosure of the identity by ISP’s or the detention 
of personal data by ISP’s and public authorities. 
 
Introduction 
 
Focussing on the right of anonymity on the Internet leads to a confrontation with an 
ambiguous perspective. Introducing and explaining the notion ‘right of anonymity’ in relation 
to the online world of the Internet indeed produces an obvious paradox. The construction or 
the expectation as if there could be such a thing like a ‘right of anonymity on the Internet’ 
indirectly refers to the discussion amongst the honourable members of the People’s Front of 
Judea, sitting in the sunny side of a Roman arena, a scene from the famous and hilarious 
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movie ‘The Life of Brian’ of Monty Python. During this scene, one of the members of the 
Front, Stan, or is it Roberta (?)2, advocates gender-bending and requests that the Front should 
recognize the right of men to give birth to a child3. Indeed a rather theoretical right, but 
according to Stan a right worth fighting for. 
 
Claiming a right of anonymity on the Internet also reflects a very high level of theorizing on 
rights and principles, as in reality such a right seems to be rather illusionary. Isn’t 
communicating over the Internet the most obvious step one can take in order to give up one’s 
anonymity: once connected on the world wide net anonymity no longer exists, except may be 
as an illusion. Getting connected on the Internet, being involved in Internet communication 
includes inevitably some kind of self-identification with always some possibility of 
traceability, if not directly, than indirectly, by authorities, by law enforcement bodies, by 
intermediaries (ISP’s) or by other private persons. As online citizens we are contributing and 
participating in our own surveillance4. Isn’t claiming a right of anonymity in the online 
environment like claiming a right to keep dry while swimming? Can there be a right of 
anonymity on the Internet? Is a right of anonymity on the Internet a pertinent and realistic 
claim in order to guarantee more freedom of expression? Can it be formulated in terms of an 
enforceable right? Is claiming a right of anonymity on the Internet a struggle against 
oppression and tyranny or is it, to paraphrase the leader of the People’s Front of Judea, “a 
symbolic struggle against reality”?  
 
Even if claiming a right of anonymity has more a symbolic value than it is a pragmatic or 
realistic assumption, it might be worth struggling for. Indeed, symbols as well can relate or 
refer to important values.  
 
And even if in now a days reality of the Internet a right of anonymity seems to be illusionary, 
it does not exclude that the reality of the Internet shouldn’t be modified in order to have such 
a right (better) respected in the future. Isn’t precisely the law meant to protect the rights of 
individuals5? The crucial question however is whether the individual should have a right on 
anonymity. 
 
What is anonymity? 
 
The notion anonymous comes from the Greek “anonumous”, which means ‘without name’. 
The notion “pseudonyme” also stems from the old Greek: “pseudo-onoma”, which means 
‘false name’. In the modern or rather post-modern world of the information society, 
anonymity is defined as an aspect of (informational) privacy. Personal data are protected, the 
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use of it is regulated and restricted6. Anonymity however is also a part of social interaction: it 
means reducing the disclosure of your identity to certain circles, certain persons, certain areas 
of social life and society. Anonymity is a relative concept indeed, also e.g. from a time 
perspective. Anonymity cannot be absolute, as there will always be other persons, be it in a 
technical, confidential, intimate or professional relation, who will be informed about one’s 
identity, sooner or later. As individuals living in a community, participating in social life, we 
inevitably leave traces of our identity. The question is to what extend one can be non-
identifiable or not-retraceable. Non-identifiable or not-retraceable by whom? Non-identifiable 
or not-retraceable for how long time? 
 
A basic characteristic and very often the essential goal of anonymity is the reduction of 
responsibility for one’s action. Anonymity creates a possibility to do things that one would 
not do or should not do in ‘normal’ circumstances. Wearing a mask, being dressed in a 
carnival costume, hiding in the dark, using anonymous remailers, participating with a 
pseudonym in chat rooms, residing in a big city… are all examples that make us more or less 
invisible, anonymous. Being anonymous also creates a feeling of freedom, of liberty to do 
things that one is not supposed to do under conventional or traditional mechanisms of social 
control. In other words : anonymity reduces social control. Anonymity creates freedom. 
 
Anonymity : from fascinating attraction to fundamental human right 
 
The phenomenon of anonymity has inspired many writers and philosophers and has more 
recently also inspired filmmakers. Readers and audiences are fascinated by anonymity and 
invisibility. In his Politeia, Plato refers to the story of Gyges, told by his pupil Glaukon: a 
story about a ring that made the (royal) shepherd Gyges invisible7. In Tolkien’s ‘Lord of the 
Rings’ it is also a ring that makes its bearers (Frodo and Bilbo Gaggins) invisible. In the 
mysterious science-fiction novel of H.G. Wells, ‘The Invisible Man’ (1897) it is a former 
brilliant medical student, Griffin, who succeeded to develop a formula and an experiment to 
become invisible, making that his body did not absorb nor reflect light.  
 
In George Orwell’s8 ‘1984’ the author evocates the total negation of anonymity due to the 
permanent surveillance by the telescreen and the thought police. The book is still the great 
modern classic of the negative Utopia, referring to a world where the individual is extremely 
vulnerable under the eyes of ‘Big Brother’. As George Orwell wrote and Winston Smith 
experienced : “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at 
any given moment”. Orwell describes how a (political) system and a society in which the 
individual is permanently monitored and where (occasional) anonymity is inexistent, is 
dehumanising. It is indeed only in modern democracies that rights of anonymity became 
respected and guaranteed as fundamental human rights. 
 
Why claim a right of anonymity? 
 
The claim or desire to (temporary) anonymity finds its basis in the will to escape from danger 
or social control, but especially to escape from oppression or totalitarian censorship. 
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Anonymity has been used for a variety of reasons, ranging from fear of persecution or 
retaliation, avoiding the risk of discrimination9 to prejudice of privacy. Anonymity in relation 
to freedom of speech is a tool to circumvent censorship or to avoid bureaucratic control or 
harassment by authorities or others10. According to the US Supreme Court “anonymity is a 
shield against the tyranny of the majority. . . . [It] protect[s] unpopular individuals from 
retaliation - and their ideas from suppression - at the hand of an intolerant society’’. The US 
Supreme Court also stated that “anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but a honourable tradition of advocacy and of dissent”11, recognizing a right of 
anonymity as protected under the US First Amendment12. 
 
In recent years, a firm claim for digital anonymity has been formulated. 
 
Who benefits from digital anonymity? Whistle-blowers, victims of abuse, and troubled 
people seeking counseling. Political insiders, the politically incorrect, and insurrectionists. 
Gays, lesbians, and bored straights. Bad poets. People trying the fit of another skin. 
Virtually everyone. You. You deserve at least as much anonymity on the Net as you have 
when you cast a vote, post an anonymous tract, or buy a newspaper from a coin-operated 
rack In fact, you should demand a stronger right on the Net. Otherwise, authorities will 
find it easy to track, sort, and record your digital behavior. You should thus demand the 
right to use the most powerful encryption available13. 
 
Rights of anonymity: they do exist! 
 
In essence, anonymity is to be considered as a shield against oppression, harassment,  
retaliation, censorship or discrimination and therefore is it considered as a vital component of 
freedom of speech or freedom of expression. Anonymity (or using a pseudonym) can also be 
used for gathering information that in other occasions would be much more difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain as a journalist, as e.g. in undercover or alias journalism14. People who 
are leaking information from within an organisation, public service or commercial company, 
such as ‘whistle blowers’, can claim a right of freedom of expression15 and they can also 
protect themselves by not disclosing their identity when communicating information to others, 
to media or to journalists. In case of a confidential relation between a source and a journalist, 
the journalist will guarantee the non-disclosure of the identity of his source. In order to 
respect confidentiality between sources and journalists, journalists (- in the broad sense of the 
word -) can rely on a right not to be compelled to reveal their sources, as recognized in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. According to the European Court the 
protection of a journalist’s sources is one of the basic conditions for freedom of the press : 
“Without such protection, sources might be deterred from assisting the press in informing the 
public on matters of public interest and, as a result, the vital public-watchdog role of the 
press might be undermined”. The order to disclose a source can only be justified by an 
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overriding requirement in the public interest. It is also underlined by the Court that limitations 
on the confidentiality of journalistic sources “call for the most careful scrutiny by the 
Court”16. In order to guarantee a more effective protection of journalistic sources in the 
member states, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
Recommendation (2000) 7 “on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of 
information” (8 March 2000) 17, inviting the member states to implement in their domestic 
law and practice the protection of journalistic sources, i.e. to “provide for explicit and clear 
protection of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source in 
accordance with Article 10 of the Convention”. The protection of journalistic sources is also 
applicable for online media and for online journalism. 
Also other kinds of anonymity rights have been recognised, such as the respect for secret 
ballot, guaranteed by Article 3 of the First Protocol: “The High Contracting Parties undertake 
to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. More 
recently the principle of secret ballot has also been recognised as a basic value to be respected 
in applications of e-voting18. The Recommendation of the Council of Europe on e-voting 
stipulates under ‘Secret suffrage’:  
16. E-voting shall be organised in such a way as to exclude at any stage of the voting 
procedure and, in particular, at voter authentication, anything that would endanger the 
secrecy of the vote. 
17. The e-voting system shall guarantee that votes in the electronic ballot box and votes 
being counted are, and will remain, anonymous, and that it is not possible to reconstruct a 
link between the vote and the voter.  
18. The e-voting system shall be so designed that the expected number of votes in any 
electronic ballot box will not allow the result to be linked to individual voters.  
19. Measures shall be taken to ensure that the information needed during electronic 
processing cannot be used to breach the secrecy of the vote. 
 
Another kind of right of anonymity is enshrined in international copyright law. The Bern 
Convention in its Art. 7, 3 en 15, 3 gives recognition to anonymous and pseudonymous 
works19.  
 
A right of anonymity is also reflected in the decisions of non-disclosure of names of parties in 
legal proceedings. Anonymising the identity of persons is applied in national and international 
case law in order to protect plaintiffs, defendants, victims, suspects, witnesses or applicants. 
The European Court of Human Rights for instance can, on request, decide not to disclose the 
name of the applicant. Section 47, 3 of the Rules of the Court (2007) provides that “applicants 
who do not wish their identity to be disclosed to the public shall so indicate and shall submit a 
statement of the reasons justifying such a departure from the normal rule of public access to 
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information in proceedings before the Court. The President of the Chamber may authorise 
anonymity in exceptional and duly justified cases”. This rule has been applied in the case V. v. 
U.K and in T. v. U.K.20 , as the Court in its judgment indeed didn’t disclose the identity of the 
applicants, two ten-year-old boys, “V.” and “T.”, convicted for murder and abduction21 of 
another young boy, regardless of the fact that the names of Jon Venables and Robert 
Thompson were made public by the British press and on the Internet22.  The Court also 
protected from public disclosure the name of the applicant and other persons involved in the 
domestic proceedings in a case related to a divorce, sexual offences and the infection with the 
(aids)virus HIV, a case in which the applicant precisely complained about a violation of her 
privacy during the domestic proceedings in Finland23. In the case of A. v. U.K.24, again a case 
on Article 8 (right of privacy), the Court decided not to reveal the name of the applicant. In 
this case the applicant and her children had been suffering of racial abuses. The Court had 
come to the conclusion that the earlier disclosure by a member of Parliament of the name and 
address of the applicant during a parliamentary debate was protected by the parliamentary 
immunity which had to be given absolute protection under Article 10 of the Convention25. 
This finding however did not take away the necessity to mask the identity of the applicant in 
the Court’s judgment. In another case related to the right of privacy and membership of the 
Freemasons, the Court decided to anonymise the identity of the applicant, a judge who had 
been a member of the Adriano Lemmi Lodge in Milan26. Also in a few exceptional cases 
related to freedom of expression, the Court decided not to disclose the identity of the 
applicant, as this was the case in I.A. v. Turkey, a case in which the applicant complained of a 
conviction in Turkey for blasphemy against “God, the Religion, the Prophet and the Holy 
Book” through the publication of a book27. The anonymity or non-disclosure of the identity of 
litigants in court proceedings or the public communication of names of parties in judicial 
decisions becomes even more a legitimate concern and a controversial issue in the online 
world of legal databases and search engines. 
 
Another concern in the area of  claims on privacy protection and the right of anonymity is the 
non-traceability, in general28 or specifically regarding protection of minors. In a recent 
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declaration by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Committee 
underlines “that the traceability of children’s activities via the Internet may expose them to 
criminal activities, such as the solicitation of children for sexual purposes, or otherwise 
illegal or harmful activities, such as discrimination, bullying, stalking and other forms of 
harassment, by others”29. The Committee declared that, other than in the context of law 
enforcement, “there should be no lasting or permanently accessible record of the content 
created by children on the Internet which challenges their dignity, security and privacy or 
otherwise renders them vulnerable now or at a later stage in their lives” and it invited the 
member states and stakeholders “to explore the feasibility of removing or deleting such 
content, including its traces (logs, records and processing), within a reasonably short period 
of time”. 
 
Right of anonymity, freedom of expression and the Internet30 
 
With regard to freedom of speech and the Internet it is often reiterated that a right of 
anonymity will guarantee more to participate in public debate. It is considered both in the 
individual’s interest and in the public interest that guaranteeing a right of anonymity will 
stimulate that more voices will be heard. Publishing or communicating anonymous should not 
be considered as an offence: anonymous communication does not harm or damage “as such”. 
The prohibition or criminalisation of anonymity is considered a violation of the right to 
freedom of expression.  
 
A right of anonymity however will inevitably have a relative character. Due to technical 
reasons and social interaction there is no absolute guarantee on anonymity. Very often the 
content provider will have no interest at all in anonymity, as anonymity or lack of 
authentification might also reduce the credibility or the reliability of the content. In a 
corporate or commercial environment the need for identification will even be predominant, 
such as the need for identification of legal persons or firms in order to protect consumer 
interest. This concern is clearly reflected in the EU-directive 2007/65 concerning the 
provision of audiovisual media services, promulgating an obligation of identification by the 
audiovisual media service providers (MSP’s). Art. 3a stipulates that MSP’s shall make easily, 
directly and permanently accessible to the reception of a service at least the following 
information: 
a) the name of the MSP 
b) the geographical adress of the MSP 
c) the mail adress or website of the MSP 
d) the competent regulatory or supervisory bodies 
 
Because of the impact of audiovisual services on the way people form their opinions, it is 
considered “essential for users to know exactly who is responsible for the content of these 
services”31. Art. 5 of the EU Directive 2000/31 on E-commerce contains a very similar 
approach, requesting that member states shall ensure that services providers shall render 
easily, directly and permanently this kind of information accessible to the recipients of the 
service and to the competent authorities 
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 The reason why a right of anonymity cannot be absolute, is the society’s interest in 
determining one’s accountability, responsibility or liability in case of illegal or harmful 
content. In this context the right of anonymity is to be brought in balance with the duties and 
responsibilities when exercising the right of freedom of expression, which might include a 
need for identification and traceability of the content provider. In criminal law, for reasons of 
civil liability, for the protection of intellectual property law or in the area of commercial 
communications and advertising, the need for identification will reduce the protection of 
one’s right to anonymity32. 
 
This principle is reflected in the EU Directive 2000/31 on E-Commerce, as in Art. 15, the 
principle is recognised of “No general obligation to monitor”. The directive stipulates indeed 
that “Member states shall not impose a general obligation on providers to monitor the 
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation to seek actively facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity”. However Art. 15 continues that “Member states 
may establish obligations for ISP’s promptly to inform competent public authorities of alleged 
illegal activities or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to 
communicate the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the 
identification of recipients of their services”. 
 
This approach of the recognition of a right of anonymity on the Internet, to be balanced with 
other rights of the individuals (good name and reputation, privacy, consumers’ rights, 
copyright protection33) and/or public interest (hate speech, major crime, child pornography, 
terrorism) resulting in a need for ‘ex post’ identification or traceability afterwards, is also 
clearly reflected in the Declaration of the Council of Europe on Freedom of Communication 
on the Internet (28 May 2003). 
 
Principle 7 of the Declaration under the title “Anonymity”, stipulates : 
 
In order to ensure protection against online surveillance and to enhance the free 
expression of information and ideas, member states should respect the will of users of the 
Internet not to disclose their identity. 
 
This does not prevent member states from taking measures and co-operating in order to 
trace those responsible for criminal acts, in accordance with national law, the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other international 
agreements in the fields of justice and the police. 
 
Striking a fair balance between the right of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity 
and tracing those responsible for criminal acts is the difficult but also inevitable challenge in 
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this regard, a balance which cannot be found without respecting rigorously the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of the involved persons. These rights and freedoms also need to be 
protected with extra procedural guarantees, e.g. regarding the disclosure of the identity by 
ISP’s or the detention of personal data by ISP’s and public authorities. An additional and final 
question is whether a right of anonymity is (still) ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in a 
society in which the individuals’ human rights are (sufficiently) protected in accordance e.g. 
with the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? 
 
In the mean time, it is better not putting too much confidence or hope in the rather fictional 
illusion of anonymity. Paraphrasing G. Orwell ‘1984’, “There IS of course no way of knowing 
whether you ARE being watched at any given moment”. 
 
